By Aurelio Montinola III, BPI President
This is another article on the financial crisis shared to us by Ed.
The following was forwarded to me, and I assume that it is genuine. It may
be useful to readers in terms of planning their family and personal
finances for the coming year. Montinola expects two major difficulties:
first, as Chinese exports to America are affected, Philippine exports,
mainly oriented towards China, will be affected; second, layoffs of
Filipinos overseas will start having an impact on remittances and
Attached please find a piece that I was supposed to write for an outside
publication - unfortunately, I cannot submit it as the ending is
What I thought to be a gathering storm to hit in the first quarter of 2009
has hit our beaches yesterday - the Philippine Stock Exchange had its
highest (12. 27 %) drop in history a single day, and the Peso Dollar
exchange rate is creeping back from around P 41: $ 1 to almost P 50 : $1.
Like other markets in the region, the PSEI has dropped 50% ytd, and people
are getting nervous.
It has now become a Fundamentals versus Emotion issue - Philippine economic
fundamentals relative to the world and even Asia are good, and the banking
system is stable, but Bloomberg 24×7 Television, local media reports, and
cocktail party talk make people fear the worst, and then expect the worst.
We know however from experience that Filipinos are resilient and have
survived the economic crises of the foreign debt moratorium in the 1980s
and the Asian Crisis in the 1990s.
BPI remains well capitalized, strong, and prudent - and both our customers
and the market analysts appreciate this. 2008 will show lower earnings than
our banner year in 2007, and we must now worry about what 2009 will bring.
As in the past, this negative cycle will eventually pass, but in the
meantime, we will have to prepare for the typhoon.
Let us all work together to take care of our customers, and in the process,
keep BPI strong and our employees safe and secure in their jobs.
All the best,
FINANCIAL TSUNAMI 2008
On Sept 15 2008, the unthinkable happened. Lehman Brothers, a Triple A
credit rated, 4th largest, and 158 year old US investment bank, filed for
bankruptcy. Merrill Lynch was rescued and sold to Bank of America, and one
day later, AIG, the world's largest insurer, announced its effective
nationalization. This set off a chain of notorious "firsts" - a $ 700
billion bailout of the US banking system that almost did not pass, a
country (Iceland) almost going bankrupt, and the largest UK banks in
By the IMF meeting on Oct 13, two additional unthinkables were unfolding.
Global stock markets had fallen 20% in a week, the entire global banking
system had almost collapsed, and it took the collective resolve of 27
European governments and the US to institute forceful emergency
circuitbreaker measures to temporarily calm the world and prevent a
catastrophic breakdown of financial markets worldwide. However, in the most
free market oriented countries of the developed world, the US and the UK
had effectively partially nationalized the largest banks without a public
How did this happen, and what is the effect on the Philippines, and the
Act 1 - 2007 Housing Collapse
Home ownership ($ 20 trillion) and equities ownership ($ 20 trillion) are
central to the American middle class dream of becoming wealthy. Borrowing
money is equally ingrained - the US household debt today is larger than
what the US can produce through its GDP (Gross Domestic Product). America
became the world's largest consumer of cheap imported goods, and China
became the world's largest producer.
Through a confluence of events, a deadly cocktail was being concocted.
First was increased home ownership demand in a boom time. Next was easy
credit (1% US Fed Funds rate), and commercial banks relaxing credit
standards (zero down payment) to lend to subprime borrowers (with minimal
income) due to the belief that home prices would forever rise and therefore
this would protect the loan from default. Third were investment banks
securitizing or packaging a pool of these loans ("mortgage backed
securities" ) backed up by credit agencies rating the top slices as Triple
A credits. Finally, there were commercial banks and hedge funds with
sophisticated risk models who greedily bought into these instruments as a
means of increasing the yields on their books.
Initially, home prices soared 20% as the bubble grew with triple leverage
(housing loan, investment bank securitization, and hedge funds buying).
What was not apparent was that due to lax US regulations, investment banks
had leverage (debt to equity ) ratios of 35 to 1, and unregulated Hedge
funds had a 30:1 debt to equity ratio. Going up (2002 to 2007), everyone
Suddenly, in 2007, some subprime borrowers defaulted, homes were
foreclosed, and home prices fell. Countryside Financial, a US institution,
almost failed, while Northern Rock, a UK institution, failed due to bad
loans and falling house prices. The housing bubble had burst, and attention
shifted to major commercial and investment banks with exposure to the
Act 2 - 2008 Financial Markets Meltdown
First to go were the investment banks and AIG.
By regulatory fiat after the Great Depression, investment banks were
separated from commercial banks. By anti regulatory bias in the past
decade, Alan Greenspan, the US free market "maestro" of financial policy,
and the Federal Reserve Bank took away a 12:1 debt to equity regulatory
ceiling, and allowed investment banks to use "sophisticated" risk models to
justify 35:1 debt to equity levels and help sell billions of dollars of
CDOs ("collateralized debt obligations" ) that eventually peaked at $ 55
trillion, which is the size of the world's GDP! Worse, AIG sold $ 400
billion CDSs ("Credit Default Swaps") insuring against the default of
housing related securities.
The result should have been obvious. Normal leverage is 2:1 for a
manufacturing company, 3:1 for a trading company, and 12:1 for a commercial
bank. At 35:1, an investment bank happily made a 35% return on its capital
if its position income only rose 1%; however, if the position dropped 10%,
it would lose 350% of its position, and severely erode its capital.
Banks operate on liquidity (free flow of funds), solvency (amount of
capital to pay for obligations) , and Trust (market confidence in normally
operating institutions) .
Once the market saw the falling home prices deteriorating into potentially
illiquid asset prices, counterparties started holding back and stopped
dealing with suspect investment banks. Bear Stearns was rescued by JP
Morgan at fire sale prices. Lehman had $ 19 billion in cash the day it went
bankrupt; not enough counterparties could be found to deal with them.
Merill Lynch was rescued by Bank of America, and Morgan Stanley by
Mitsubishi UFJ. Even the proud and mighty Goldman Sachs announced it would
become a commercial bank with lower leverage.
Next to go were the global stock markets, which acted more in unison even
if the events were initially US based., In the Great Depression, 90% of the
stock market value was lost from 1929 - 1932. Today, $ 9 trillion and 40%
has been lost since the 2007 peak, and RBS, the largest UK bank, lost 40%
in a day! Bloomberg became the most watched 24×7 television show in the
world, and fear and panic begun to spread. Most felt "poorer".
Third to go were the commercial banks.
Regulators, analysts, and banks themselves started becoming suspicious that
other commercial banks held more "toxic" (illiquid or low priced) assets
that they admitted, and that potential solvency issues lurked if asset
positions in a suspect bank wiped out capital. Recent "Fair Value "
accounting practices amplified reporting earnings volatility, as once any
item (housing prices) dropped, the industry was compelled to "Mark to
Market" these items to the new low level. If Lehman could go, so could a
Since 2007, banks have reported $ 633 billion in losses, but have raised
only $ 418 billion in new capital. If things got worse, who would they
raise additional capital from?
In simple terms, Trust, as expressed in interbank (banks lending to each
other) lending availability and price, is the Oxygen of the financial
system. When it slows to a crawl, the whole system is prone to massive
cardiac arrest. Most businesses and consumers operate on a certain assumed
debt level, and once this breaks down, prices rise astronomically if
Suddenly, from easily accessible global financial markets fuelled by cheap
and available money worldwide, an "Ice Age" of banking started. Banks with
high loan to deposit ratios requiring them to borrow from the previously
free capital markets were hit badly. Neither a US $ 700 billion troubled
asset purchase program ("TARP"), or piecemeal European home country deposit
guarantees initially helped.
Washington Mutual was bought by JP Morgan, and Wachovia by Wells Fargo in
the US. The European solution was government based, as the UK, Dutch, and
French governments offered massive government capital to save and
strengthen household names like RBS and ING.
Effectively, 27 European governments voted together for 3 measures -
partially nationalizing large "significant" banks, partially guaranteeing
retail deposits, and guaranteeing interbank lending. The US followed by
offering funding and partial nationalization to 9 banks, and direct lending
to US corporations through the commercial paper market. The IMF put a brave
front announcing the measures, but many wondered why the IMF was not more
active in the process.
Act 3 - 2008 Countries in Crisis
Even countries started running into trouble - as of press date, Korea,
Pakistan, and Argentina were in various forms of funding problems, and the
latter two were rumored to have to go to the IMF. Iceland became the first
Western country in 40 years to seek IMF help.
Act 4 - 2009 Real Economy Recession
Clearly, the next wave would be a real economy US and European recession,
which would then overflow to the emerging market countries.
In the US, massive deleveraging has started, and unemployment has risen.
The consumer spends 75% of a $ 14 trillion economy, and financial sector
debt is 115 % of the GDP. Working capital bank lines are cut, while people
strive to pay back credit card debt. Businesses are closing, and consumer
related industries will suffer the most.
In Europe, the housing collapse in Spain and Ireland has spread to the
financial services layoffs in the UK to overall demand cut everywhere.
A year ago, Asia hoped to "decouple" from the US; today , this is fantasy.
Once the world's largest buyer (the US) stopped buying, the world's largest
producer (China) would have growth cutbacks, with corresponding effects on
the rest of Asia. GDP in the US and Europe could fall to zero or negative,
but in Asia it would be lower growth, but still positive.
The Philippines - A Gathering Storm
Fortunately, the Philippines is small, far away, and of less marketing
interest to sophisticated financiers. Also, its banking and insurance
industries are more heavily regulated. In addition, the painful 1997 Asian
crisis has left Filipino businessmen and bankers more cautious and more
resilient than their Western (former) idols.
Given this, the Philippines dodged the Housing Subprime bullet, and was
only minimally affected by the US investment bank and UK commercial bank
Philippine local currency banking operates normally, as Sept yoy lending
growth remains close to 20%, while the deposit market remains fairly
We will go through dollar funding strain just like all other emerging
market countries, but hopefully this storm will pass.
Banking is all about Growth and Earnings in good years, and about
Liquidity, Solvency, and Trust in bad years. While growth and earnings will
be significantly lower in 2008 and 2009, hopefully they will still be
positive. Liquidity and Solvency should be manageable for as long as
Filipinos continue to Trust the banking system to function normally.
However, we will be hit hard in 2009 - the first wave will probably be
trade related, as the US cuts back on imports from the Philippines and
China (which imports from the Philippines) .
The second wave could be more fearful - a significant drop in OFW
remittances as some lose their jobs or need more for their overseas needs.
Today, we contend that we are more insulated due to global OFW
diversification and higher level jobs, but in a global recession, we will
not be spared.
What to Do
Just as we prepare for a typhoon, we have to prepare for potentially rainy
days in 2009.
For businesses, your balance sheet will become critical. You must reduce
your debt to acceptable levels, and you must think through your business
model in a low growth economy. Fro example, can a 20% drop in revenue cover
your overhead? If not, some serious cost cutting is needed.
For consumers, it will be time to reduce unnecessary expenses (electricity
consumption, gasoline, impulse purchases) and to start saving even a small
portion of your monthly income. Capital preservation is critical, so think
through your KYC ("Know Your Counterparty" ), and your asset allocation. If
you can, keep 25% in cash or bank placements, and 75% in fixed income
instruments until you are brave enough to reenter the stock market.
If you want to spend anything, either ask yourself twice or postpone the
decision for a day - you will be surprised how many items will feel less
necessary or desirable the day after.
However, we Filipinos are resilient, and we will survive this crisis as we
survived the bank moratorium in the 80s and the Asian Crisis in the 90s.
Good luck to us all!
AURELIO R. MONTINOLA, III
Bankers Association of the Philippines
Bank of the Philippine Islands
October 27, 2008
Saturday, November 15, 2008
By Aurelio Montinola III, BPI President
Video Clips of the Years Spent in Daet Parochial School
- DPS Elementary Years - Part I
- DPS Elementary Years - Part II
- DPS Elementary Years - Part III
- DPS High School Years - Part I
- DPS High School Years - Part II
- DPS High School Years - Part III
- DPS High School Years - Part IV
- DPS High School Years - Part V
- DPS High School Years - Part VI
- DPS High School Years - Part VII